امکان‌سنجی اعطای شخصیت حقوقی به ربات‌های هوشمند با تکیه بر مصوبه اتحادیه اروپا (شخص الکترونیک - 2017)

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه حقوق، دانشگاه پیام نور، ایران

چکیده

امکان ایجاد دستگاه‌ها و ماشین‌های با قابلیت تفکر و یادگیری باعث شده تا بسیاری از مسائل اخلاقی مطرح شود با این اطمینان که به انسان‌ها و دیگر موجودات و حتی خود آسیب نمی‌رسانند. رشد تکنولوژی در حوزه هوش مصنوعی و رباتیک به‌رغم محاسن بسیار، معایبی را به همراه دارد برای مثال اگر ربات هوشمندی به شخص یا مالی آسیب برساند مسئول آن چه‌کسی است؟ تولید‌کننده، کاربر، مالک یا خود ربات؟ تولیدکننده، ربات‌ها را با اطلاعات پیش‌فرض و محدود تولید می‌کند و به مصرف‌کننده می‌فروشد‌. این ربات‌ها به‌دلیل الگوریتم‌های خاصی که در آن تعبیه شده قادر به تطبیق با محیط و خودآموزی هستند بنابراین رفتار ربات وقتی از محیط تولید خارج شد، برای تولیدکننده و کاربر یا مالک قابل پیش‌بینی نیست چرا‌‌که ربات هوشمند به‌صورت مستقل و بدون نظارت انسانی تصمیم می‌گیرد. از‌این‌رو زیان‌دیده به‌سختی می‌تواند عیب ربات و انتساب آن به تولیدکننده‌، مالک یا کاربر را اثبات کند‌. برای رفع خلأ مسئولیت و حمایت از زیان‌دیده، اعطای شخصیت حقوقی به ربات از‌سوی اتحادیه اروپا پیشنهاد شده است. این مقاله درصدد پاسخ به این سؤال است که آیا امکان اعطای شخصیت حقوقی به ربات هوشمند وجود دارد؟ نتایجی که با روش توصیفی و تحلیلی به‌دست آمد نشان داد اعطای شخصیت حقوقی در حال حاضر به ربات‌های هوشمند با توجه به سطح خودمختاری آن به دلایل مختلف امکان‌پذیر نیست ولی درصورتی‌که ربات به سطحی از خودمختاری و ادراک و اراده کامل برسد مانعی برای اعطای شخصیت حقوقی وجود ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Feasibility Study of Granting Legal Personality to Smart Robots Based on European Union Resolution (Electronic Person -2017)

نویسنده [English]

  • mohsen vaseghi
Assistant Professor of Law, Payame Noor University, Iran
چکیده [English]

The possibility of creating devices and machines which have capabilities to think and learn that they lead to raise a lot of ethical issues as well as ensure that these machines do not harm humans and other creatures or even themselves. In spite of many advantages, the evolution of technology in the field of artificial intelligence and robotics have some disadvantages. One of the disadvantages is: Who is responsible if a smart robot injuries to a person or property? Producer, user, owner or a robot itself? The manufacturer produces the robots which include pre-assumptions and limited information then sales them to the users. These robots are able to adapt to the environment as well as self-study because of certain algorithms embedded in it. So the robot’s behavior is not predictable for the producer, user or the owner after it comes out of the production environment because the smart robot can decide independently or without human supervision. Therefore, the aggrieved person can hardly prove the fault of the robot as well as its attribution to the producer or the owner. In this connection, the issue of granting legal personality has been proposed by the European Union to address the responsibility gap as well as support of the aggrieved party. This paper tries to answer the question that granting legal personality to the smart robot is possible? We have concluded that now, granting legal personality to smart robots is impossible for different reasons through using analytical- descriptive research method but there will be feasible to grant the legal personality if the robot is autonomous as well as having a complete/legal will.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Robot
  • Autonomy
  • Smart
  • Legal Personality
  • Artificial Intelligence
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