عنوان مقاله [English]
The sanctions which have been imposed against Iran by foreign countries and some international bodies have been oconsidered as one of the most important economic challenges facing our country in recent years. The sanction consists of a set of planned measures which have been taken by one or more governments in order to curtail economic relations of the target state as well as exert pressure on it for different economic and political reasons. The accompaniment of other major economic and political acors with the boycotting state will play an effective role in achieving its objectives. This coordination aggrevates the complexities of actors’ relations in the international sanctions environment. Therefore, the method of agent-based approach and game theory are used to analyze the problem of sanctions as well as predict the possible equilibrium in these relations. Due to the networking and breadth of the issue of sanctions as well as looking for the optimal solution to widespread interactions arising from competition, coordination and negotiation, an agent-based approach is used in this paper. Presenting a multidisciplinary approach including game theory, agent-based systems, artificial intelligence and mechanism design in order to analyze the complicated problems of the US sanctions against Iran as well as providing results of the simulation of actors’ behaviors, the paper attempts to introduce a new approach to modeling of political-economic phenomana.To this end, actors as well as their effective features on the sanctions game, scope of the game strategies have been identified as well as the simulation of actors’ behaviors have been conducted within the (above) mentioned framework. Results of the simulation of the actors’ behaviors on the proposed spectrum which includes two extremes of capitulation and confrontation shows that dominant strategy in the current situation is only emphasizing on the maintenance of the current nuclear deal/agreement formally known as JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) as well as effective actors’ on the sanctions game against Iran should continue bargaining in a Cartesian Coordinate System not confrontation and capitulation. Finally, this game will be stablized after eight rounds of JCPOA negotiation are held. Over the periods, the orientation of US and its alignments in the Middle East region are shifted towards accepting (position of) other actors to continue Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) negotiation. But the limited orientation of some of the domestic agents might be considered as a credible threat in US–Iran standoff.