In the contemporary international order, the concept of power has evolved from relying solely on hard tools to methods of influence based on persuasion and charm. In this context, “soft law” – meaning non-binding but effective rules and standards – has become a key tool for exercising soft power and reproducing structural dominance. The present study seeks to answer the question of how soft law in the context of international institutions goes beyond the level of recommendation and becomes a tool for exercising soft power and reproducing structural dominance in the international system? For this purpose, the Financial Action Task Force has been chosen as an example of the impact of soft law on the exercise of soft power. A qualitative research method based on a comparative case study has been used. The theoretical framework of the study is a combination of Joseph Nye’s “soft power” theory and critical approaches to hegemonic dominance. Soft power theory emphasizes the importance of persuasion and attraction rather than hard coercion, and explains how international institutions can use non-coercive tools to shape the behavior of actors. To answer this question, the article focuses on two key mechanisms: first, “normalization through pressure and discrediting,” which will be examined in the case study of Iran’s engagement with the Financial Action Task Force; and second, “conditionality through indexation and financial aid,” which will be analyzed in the context of the World Bank’s governance indicators in African countries. Finally, a comparative discussion between the two experiences shows that although the geopolitical contexts are different—Iran in a tense situation and Africa in a cooperative context—both mechanisms ultimately lead to the reproduction of the global hegemonic order.