In the legislative process, conflicts between values such as justice, liberty, security, and human dignity are inevitable. In such situations, the absence of a numerical standard or decisive priority among these values poses a fundamental challenge, commonly referred to as the incommensurability of values. Attempts to reduce all values to a single metric are not only ineffective but also misleading. This article begins by examining both the literal and conceptual meanings of incommensurability and then analyzes arguments for and against this notion. In defense of incommensurability, three key arguments are explored: the ontological argument, which emphasizes the fundamental differences among values; the epistemological argument, which highlights the cognitive limitations of human comparison; and the pragmatic argument, which points to the problematic consequences of imposing a single standard. The article then addresses the central question: how is decision-making possible under conditions of value incommensurability? In response, it introduces three theoretical models: rational judgment, which allows for reasoned evaluation without quantitative metrics; the theory of human agency, which stresses the role of commitments and meaningful choice; and bounded rationality, which bases decisions on practical sufficiency rather than optimality.