Factors effecting credit diversion

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Professor, Allameh Tabatabaii University

2 Associate Professor , Allameh Tabatabaii University

3 alameh tabatabaie university

4 monetary and banking research

Abstract

Banks play major roles in each economic system through having a large part of the circulating funds (of the community). In Islamic banking, credits are granted in terms of concluding Islamic contracts. Credits in the form of Islamic contracts (especially, exchanging contracts and partnership agreements) cause that applicants can take benefit of these credits inappropriately as well as make up fake documents that consequently, they lead to the deviation of credits due to some factors such as moral hazard and adverse selection that these obvious problems have been originated from the asymmetric information. In this paper, following a survey which has been conducted through using questionnaires (including 20 questions), effective factors on credit diversion have been investigated. Results and analysis of Friedman test and Cronbach's alpha coefficient indicate that credit diversion has a direct relationship with some components such as the amount of (concessional financing) credits, the interest rate on bank lending (banking facilities) and the share of collaborative contracts (partnership agreements).

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References

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Majlis and Rahbord
Volume 26, Issue 98 - Serial Number 98
September 2019
Pages 41-69

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