Supplier-Induced Demand (SID) for Medical Services by Iranian Physicians (Policymaking and Controlling)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 parliament research center

2 Research Director

Abstract

Physicians do their job as the patients’ perfect agents as well as they can manipulate their patients’ demands for healthcare services. This line of reasoning drives from the Physician-Induced Demand (PID) which leads to create additional demands of these services for patients unnecessarily. Under the PID hypothesis, physicians (suppliers) influence patients’ demands to suit their own interests. The research relies on mixed methods research synthesis (MMRS) that integrates both qualitative and quantitative evidences as well as it is conducted through using thematic analysis method and decision making models. According to findings of the research, the most obvious factors affecting physicians’ behaviors in occurring induced demand for healthcare services include expectations of physicians to activate other medical sections, physicians' authority in patients' compliance, insufficient supervision over physician prescribing practices (irrational prescriptions), physicians' independency of insurance contracts and physician's tendency to provide inappropriate healthcare services for the patient in the public sector.
       Results of the research reveals that the implementation of a well-functioning referral system to healthcare provision on Iranian (rural) family physician is determined as a major goal to impede physician-induced demand. In this regard, clinical guidelines for family physicians which are mandatory should be developed.  Hence, it is suggested that a permanent legislation on “the establishment of a comprehensive system for health services” (electronic health record system) is approved.

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Main Subjects


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