Government system's institutional implications

Document Type : Research Paper

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Abstract

One of the main functions of the constitutions is to organize political power within the various branches of government. They do this according to the different interpretations of the doctrine of the separation of powers which in turn create different system of governments i.e. parliamentary, presidential and hybrid systems. Yet, each of those systems has its own characteristics in a given county. One might ask regarding these differences and implications whether one type of government can be preferred to another. Is it the case that one type of government be better than another one? Main argument of the present paper is that none of them might be preferred to another one regardless of the expectations of their designers and the relative success of them to realization of the those aims and expectations.

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